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3I.  OVERVIEW  OF  LATVIAN  PENSION  REFORM
In  1995, Latvia became the first country in Central and Eastern Europe to  implement
parametric  reform of the Soviet-style  PAYGO  pension system, and the first in the world to
implement the  "notional defined contribution system" (NDC)  originally designed for
Sweden (Palmer, 1999). The Government's intention was to follow the overhaul of the
PAYGO system with the creation of a funded second tier by  1998, but the reform has
lagged. Public acceptance  of the new system has been poor, and pressures for rollback of
the reforms have grown. In the pre-election  period of 1998, many of these pressures  were
accommodated.  Meanwhile, other transition economies are blazing a new path. In  1997,
Hungary implemented  a  full parametric reform with a  funded second tier,  and in  1998
Poland passed all legislation to implement  one as well, using the NDC approach for the
PAYGO (based on the Latvian and Swedish experience). Countries as distinct as Russia,
Mongolia, and Brazil are all considering adopting variants of the NDC approach Latvia
pioneered.
Latvia's  early  successes encouraged many of  its  neighbors, and  the  pension reform
community. Indeed, Swedish newspapers ran stories about the Latvian implementation  of
the Swedish  reforms ahead of Sweden.  After such a splashy  beginning why did the Latvian
reform stall?  What has been the net effect of the reforms after the roll backs? How did
Latvia balance the  difficult  issues of  system incentives, fairness (within and  across
generations) and affordability?  What are the lessons of the Latvian experience with the
NDC system for other reforming countries?  These questions are the subject of this paper.
In section I, we set the stage for the reform, describe the key provisions of the original
reform and discuss  the subsequent  amendments.  In section II, we use simulations  to analyze
the macro-economic  and microeconomic  impact of the reform. In section III, we evaluate
the reforms, drawing  lessons  for other countries.
THE SETTING:  TRANSITION  AND THE GoALs  OF THE REFORM
Since achieving  independence  from the Soviet Union in 1990, Latvia has moved steadily
toward establishment  of a market economy and the development  of democratic institutions.
The first years of independence  were difficult. Income fell by over 40 percent and prices
soared 900 percent in 1992. By 1993, stabilization  was successful, a new, stable currency
was launched  and the structural  reform of the economy  was underway. Prices are now fully
liberalized and trade is open. Privatization is almost complete, with  only a  few large
enterprises and some housing remaining. Despite a banking crisis in 1995 and recent fall
out from the Russia crises, Latvia has realized positive economic growth since 1996 and
medium term growth prospects are excellent. Latvia hopes to enter the European Union
with the first group of eastern countries.
As in other East European countries, Latvia entered the transition with a full welfare
system, promising  cradle-to-grave  income maintenance.  Reform of this system has been an
essential, but difficult, part of the transition. An initial reform was undertaken in 1990-
1992, primarily designed to enhance the social safety net during stabilization  and price
liberalization  phase.  This legislation basically enshrined previous Soviet benefit rights,
4including  a multiplicity  of  special pension  regimes,  sickness and  maternity benefits,  and
numerous allowances.  In December  1991 an employment benefit was created.
As the transition proceeded,  it became increasingly clear that many of the entitlements that
seemed affordable  and appropriate under  central planning were hindering the development
of  the  market  economy.  The most  obvious  reason  was the high  and  rising  cost,  which
posed  an  increasingly  greater  fiscal  burden,  crowding  out  the  savings  and  investment
needed to restore growth.  Expenditures  on cash transfers  climbed from  an already high 7
percent of GDP in 1985 to over 14 percent of GD]P  in 1994 (Box 1).
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Most of this increase was accounted for by massive growth in pension expenditures relative
to GDP - from 5.5 percent  in 1985 to  10.4 percent in 1994.  Expenditures increased both
because of a large growth in pensioners since 1990, and because benefit levels in real terms
did not fall as far as GDP.  New benefits created (such as the expansion in family benefits
and the new unemployment benefit) also contributed to the cost squeeze. Stop-gap measures
to  reduce  the  fiscal  burden,  (for  example,  less  generous  indexation  provisions)  were
enacted  in  1993.  However,  by  1994  it  was  clear  that  the  system  was  unsustainable
financially even with a restoration of economic growth.
Equally  important,  however,  were  the  effects  that  the  welfare  system  was  having  on
incentives to  work and  pay  taxes.  High  payroll  taxes discouraged  employment during  a
period  of  rising  unemployment.  These  high  rates  (38 percent)  encouraged  evasion  and
avoidance, and ultimately the development of the shadow economy. The weak connection
between contributions  and benefits provided additional incentives for both employers and
employees  to  reach  agreements  on  "under-the-table"  remuneration  payments  for  work.
Pensions only depended on years of service,  not on the level of contributions. In fact, for
workers to be entitled to a benefit,  it was sufficient for employers to contribute an amount
based on the minimum wage.
5Between  1991 and  1995, the number  of persons  for whom  contributions were being paid
had  declined  by  almost  50  percent.  This  flight  from  taxes,  combined  with  generous
retirement  provisions  that  discouraged  work,  and  a  weak  economy,  caused the ratio  of
pensioners to contributors to rise to 67 percent by end-1995 (Box 2). State provision of sick
leave  at  full  wage  replacement  from  the  first  day  invited  abuse  by  employers  and
employees.  Despite a falling number of contributors,  sickness benefits paid rose at roughly
the same pace as total expenditure.
Box 2:  Latvia, 1991-1998
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Large increases in public pension expenditures as a percent of GDP were characteristic of
all transition  economies during  this period (Box 3). Compared,  for example, with Poland
or Slovenia, Latvia was doing well.  But Latvia is poorer  than these countries,  and could
not as easily afford this  expenditure level, much less the alarning  increase. This  increase
was also very high by world standards.  For example, from  1985 to 1995 pension spending
as a share of GDP in the OECD on average rose from 6.2 to 6.9 (well below Latvia's  level
despite similar demographics).
Recognizing the need for fundamental reform, the Government began a systematic overhaul
of  the whole  welfare  system.  Working  groups  were  formed  throughout the  Ministry  of
Welfare to develop new laws. In 1994, a concept paper for a new pension system was sent
to Parliament.  In 1995, in a burst of activity, seven new pieces of legislation were enacted,
covering the financing,  eligibility and benefit structure of all significant cash transfers.  The
goals of the reforms were to:
*  ensure  the medium  and  long  term  affordability of  the welfare  system without
compromising the goal of an adequate social safety net;
*  improve transparency  and increase public acceptance of the system;
*  reduce  re-distributions  in  the social  insurance  system  - after  50 years  of the
Soviet system, this was an important goal for all policy makers;
6*  reduce administrative and compliance costs and incentives for abuse; and
*  increase  the  contribution  of  the  welfare  system  to  economic  growth  and
development by increasing savings and encouraging capital market deepening.
The main elements of the reform were:
*  Pension  system:  creation  of  a  new  pension  system  with benefits  based  entirely  on
contributions,  with a provision  for  the development of a  funded,  privately  managed
tier;
*  Financing:  (a)  gradual  lowering  of  social  tax  rates,  reallocation  of  contributions
between  employer  and employee  and unification of the management of  expenditures
and  reserves  within an autonomous  social insurance  fund;  and  (b) moving the  non-
contributory benefits (social assistance and farnily allowances, social pensions,  interior
ministry  pensions,  and employment  services expenditures) from  the  social  insurance
budget to general revenues;
*  Other insurance  benefits:  (a)  creation of  a  separate  occupational  disease  and  injury
insurance  scheme; (b) reform  of sick leave to  reduce abuse by making  the employee
responsible for the first day and the employer responsible for the rest  of the first  two
weeks;  and (c) changing the unemployment benefit from  one based  on the minimum
wage  to  one based  on the individual's  contribution  wage and years  of  service,  with
phased benefit reductions in order to increase the incentive to look for a job.
Box 3: Pension Expenditure  in Percent of GDP
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The reform  process continued through  the decade.  In  1997, legislation regulating private
pensions was developed,  and amendments were made to the previous legislation. In  1998,
the legislation creating the second tier (mandatory funded pension system) was developed
and  sent to  Parliament.  Of the reforms,  the pension reform  is by far  and  away the most
dramatic change, and it is the focus of the paper.
7THE OLD PENSION  SYSTEM
The key to controlling social insurance expenditures  for Latvia was pension reform. A
mature demographic structure, combined with the withdrawal of older workers from the
labor force in the face of economic  restructuring, swelled  the number of pensioners, while
lower participation of  women with children, increased evasion and a growing informal
economy reduced the  number of  contributors. With  an  aging society, a  weak fiscal
administration  and low savings, Latvia could not afford to promise high levels of income
replacement  to large portions  of the population. Reduction  of entitlements  was required.
The old-age pension system in place prior to the 1995 reform provided universal coverage
by at most age 55 for women and age 60 for men. Benefits could be claimed from age 40
for a range of occupations  and categories of people-in  effect, a system  of hidden subsidies
to select groups. Qualifying conditions included: years of service in selected occupations
where work was dangerous (for example, deep-sea salvage work) or where for physical
reasons, it was believed that most people would have to stop working earlier (pilots, wind
instrument players, ballet dancers, etc.).  Other qualifying conditions were social - e.g.
partial disability, dwarfism, being the  parent of  many children. The benefit  formula
included  a guaranteed minimum  pension of 30 percent of the national average wage, with
an increase of 0.4 percent for each year of service. In July 1995, the average old-age
pension was 33 lats',  or 50 percent of the average net wage (pensions  were not taxable).
This formula implied full wage indexation  for pensions, although  in practice this indexation
did not take place when revenues were not adequate.
THE  REFORM  CONCEPT
In January 1995, the Government submitted  to Parliament a new pension reform concept.
This called for the introduction  of a three-tier system.
- The first tier would be a  modified PAYGO system, with stronger links to
contributions  and a minimum  pension  to protect the lifetime  poor;
*  The second tier would be a mandatory, funded system of privately managed
savings accounts, created by assigning a portion of contributions  to the public
system to these accounts. This would  result in a partial funding  of the mandatory
system, reducing  the debt for future generations;
*  The  third  tier  would be  voluntary, privately managed pensions, organized
primarily (but not exclusively)  through  the employer.
This concept  was accepted  by Parliament, and work began immediately  on the first stage of
the reform - new legislation for the first tier. This legislation  was submitted  to Parliament
'  The Latvian currency  introduced after independence is the lat.  In June 1999, one dollar equaled about 0.6
lats; one lat is worth about $1.80.
8in July  1995 and  approved in November 1995, as part  of the package of welfare  system
reforms.  The new system took effect in January 1996.
THE NEW  SYSTEM - THE NDC  PAYGO  OLD-AGE BENEFIT
The new PAYGO system was a major departure from the old system (Annex Table 2).  It
was introduced with  a big bang.  Workers had  no choice whether they entered  the new
system or not - from January  1996, all contributors were in,  although there are transition
provisions to smooth the change in pension deterrnination. The main features are described
in the next paragraphs.
Tying  benefits  to contributions -the NDC pension.  The new pension system is based on a
notional account principle.  It  is designed to  mimic a  lifetime contribution-based  pension
that would  be  offered by  an  insurance company.  The  system  starts by  giving  everyone
paying the  social tax an account. As contributions earmarked  for the pension  system are
paid, the account is credited,  as if it were a savings account.  Contributions credited to the
account are based on a contribution rate of 20 pe:rcent. The notional capital in the account
earns a rate of return just  like a savings account.  Instead of a financial rate of return,  the
rate  of  return  is equal  to  the  growth  of the  sumn  of  wages  on  which  contributions  are
collected (the contribution wage base). At retirement, the pension paid is equal to the total
capital in the person's  account. For example, if a person has 10,000 lats in their account at
retirement,  and is expected to live 10 more years,  the pension would be 1000 lats per year
or 83 lats per month. The pension will be indexed, adjusting for price changes (and after
year 2000, a mixture of wages and prices).
Incentives  to contribute and delay retirement. The system strongly  rewards contributions
and delayed  retirement.  Previous contributions  yield  a  rate  of  return  as  long  as  people
continue to work, and all years of contribution count. This  is a change from most public
pension systems, which often fail to reward years of contribution after those required for a
"full"  pension (e.g.  the old  Swedish system, the  current French  system,  etc.).  Working
past the minimum retirement age shortens the number of pension payments, allowing each
to be higher. At the same time, notional capital increases.
The following example (Box 4)  illustrates the NDC  system  for a  person  who begins  to
work at the age of  22 with  yearly earnings of  1400 lats.  We have projected  individual
earnings to  increase  at  the same rate  as  the average  wage 2 (in  this  example,  2  percent
nominal per  year.  Upon reaching the age of 61,  his/her  earnings are assumed to remain
unchanged,  but  the  growth  index  continues  to  rise.  With  present  Latvian  unisex  life
expectancy at age 60 and above, the size of the benefit almost doubles from age 60 to 69.
With a  10 percent higher  life expectancy at age 60 and above, the size of the benefit  is
about 9 percent smaller. If individuals in the younger generation -- whose lives after 60 are
10 percent  longer than the older generation -- want to have the same yearly benefit,  they
will have to work a little over a year longer. If the earnings of the individual continue to
2 This  illustration  implies  a completely  flat age earnings  profile, with a decline  in real terms after 60.
9increase after 60, then - by definition - individual contributions will be greater,  as will the
benefit.
Retirement age.  The standard retirement age is 60 for men and women.  Women have the
right  to  take  early  retirement  at  age  55.  This  provision  was  added  by  Parliament  in
response  to strong  lobbying.  The early  retirement  pension  is given at an  actuarially  fair
rate,  and financed from  the pension  fund. The actuarially fair pension was expected to be
so low that those in this category would continue to work.  However, because it was low for
those who claimed it, Parliament was put under pressure  to guarantee a minimum pension
to these cases (see below).
Transparent  subsidies for  redistribution.  Relative to the previous  system,  there are many
fewer privileges  for special groups within the system,  and these are more transparent  and
mostly not  financed  through  cross-subsidization  among beneficiaries.  A  few occupations
(e.g.  the military) still retain the right to retire early. The difference between an actuarially
fair pension and their pension is financed by a transfer from the military budget or the state
budget.  There  is  a  minimum  pension  for  all  those  who  reach  the  age  of  60,  set  by
Government decree.  It is currently about 56 percent of the average pension,  and about 28
percent  of the average wage.  It is financed through the cross subsidies within the pension
fund,  and is not available to those  who take a pension under  the special  early retirement
provisions. In June 1996, 4% of pensioners were covered by the guarantee.
Box 4: Simulated  NDC Account  and Pension
Present Life Expectancy  Increase  in Life Expectancy,  10%
Age  Earnings'  Growth  Notional  Pension  Replacement  Life  Pension  Replacement  Life
(Lats)  Index'  Capital  (Lats)  Rate 2 Expectancy  (Lats)  Rate 2 Expectancy
22  1400  1  280
23  1456  1  572
24  1514  1  874
60  2971  2.1223  23176  1417  49%  16.35  1289  44%  17.9
61  3031  2.1647  24245  1539  52%  15.75  1399  47%  17.3
62  3091  2.2080  25348  1673  55%  15.15  1521  50%  16.6
63  3153  2.2522  26486  1819  59%  14.56  1654  53%  16.0
64  3216  2.2972  27659  1978  63%  13.98  1799  57%  15.3
65  3280  2.3432  28868  2150  67%  13.43  1954  61%  14.7
66  3346  2.3901  30115  2342  71%  12.86  2129  65%  14.1
67  3413  2.4379  31400  2553  76%  12.3  2321  69%  13.5
68  3481  2.4866  32724  2792  82%  11.72  2538  74%  12.8
69  3551  2.5363  34088  3046  88%  11.19  2769  80%  12.3
70  3622  2.5871  35495  3327  94%  10.67  3024  85%  11.7
'Wages assumed  to grow at 2%
2 Replacement  of individual's  wage, last year of life.
Pension credit for non-contributory periods was drastically reduced, and these subsidies are
now  explicit,  as  any  pension  credit  for  non-contributory  periods  requires  actual
10contributions into an individuals notional account from the state budget (general revenues).
For time spent in military service, or at home taking care of children (maximum 1.5 years
per  child),  contributions to the pension fund are made by the state budget in the form of
budget transfers,  using the minimum wage as the contribution wage for transfer purposes.
The cost  of these transfers to  the state budget in  1997 was less that 0.1  percent of GDP.
For  those  receiving  social  insurance  benefits  (e.g.  unemployment  benefits,  disability
benefits, etc.) transfers are made from these funds to the pension fund.
The  reason  for  this  rather  awkward  transfer  mechanism  is  to  avoid  the type  of  non-
transparent  cross-subsidization  for  which  PAYGO  systems  are  famous.  In  Latvia,  it
worked. The original provisions (approved by Parliament) provided coverage for 3 years of
paid  childcare  leave  and  all  years  of  (covered)  higher  education,  the  latter  from  the
Ministry  of Education budget.  However,  once thie annual bill  for these non-contributory
periods arrived,  the Ministry of Finance quickly (leveloped proposals to scale them back to
what is described above.
Other measures  to increase transparency.  Since July  1997, annual statements have been
sent  out.  Presently,  these  include  information  on paid contributions.  Once  all historical
information  about  service  years  has  been  entered  into  the  system,  statements will  also
provide information about individual's  current account balances and the pension they would
receive  if  they retire  at age  60,  65., and  70 under  standard  assumptions.  G values  (life
expectancy factor) for the coming year are also published annually.
Transition  rule. Key issues in finalizing the legislation involved valuing acquired rights in
the old system.  The main  issue was how to  calculate initial pension  capital from the old
system.  In most countries  when  a  new  system  is proposed,  credit  is  given for  acquired
rights under the old system, either through a mixed pension (part from the old system, part
from the new system) or through  capital placed  in an account in relation to their acquired
rights.  For example, in Chile,  workers who switched to the new system got bonds whose
face value equaled the present value of their accumulated rights.  In Poland,  for those who
switched, the initial notional capital was set equal to the present value of the acquired rights
under the old system.
In Latvia, the lack of records made this challenge more daunting. While individual records
of years of service and wages existed (in "workbooks"),  the hyperinflation of 1991-2 made
these old ruble salary records  very difficult to use. No reliable price indices existed. Any
method to  set a  value on these would have been arbitrary.  As there  were no centralized
records  or  data,  simulations  of  various  formulae  were  impossible,  which  increased  the
reluctance of policy makers to base future pension liabilities on old salaries. On the other
hand, it was agreed that years of service according to workbooks were important to honor.
One of the key goals  of  the pension  reform  was to  improve  incentives to  contribute, in
order  to  reduce  the  deficit  of  expenditures  over  contributions.  One  way  to  encourage
contributions  while honoring  past  work histories was to set  a  value for  initial capital by
using  service  year  records  and  current  earnings  levels.  It  was  decided  to  base  initial
pension capital (and thus in a large measure  future pensions) on contributions in the years
11immediately following the reform.  This  was in effect placing  a very high  social value on
contributions in the first years  of the system. Earnings levels for the calculation of initial
capital for years of service prior  to 1996 were set according to the following table (Box 5).
A related  issue was how to phase  out  rights  to early  retirement,  and what  compensation
should be given for these years.  It was decided that: (a) the minimum retirement age for all
special groups would be raised by 6 months per year to the standard retirement age, and (b)
to  compensate  for  the  acquired  rights,  their  pension  capital  would  be  increased  in
proportion  to  their  early  retirement  right  and  years  of  service  in  the  occupation.  For
example, for a man with 20 years of service in an occupation which provided the right to
retire at 50, the pension capital for those years would be increased by 60/50 (a 20 percent
increase).
Box 5:  Latvia - Transition Rules for Calculating Initial Notional  Capital
Retirement  year  Formula
1996:  The average contribution  wage 3 for the whole population, 1995
1997:  The average of the individual  contribution  wage, 1996-7
1998:  The average of the individual  contributions,  1996-1998
1999  The average of the individual  contributions,  1996-99
2000 and after:  The average of the individual  contribution, 1996-2000.
To compute average annual eamings from 1996-2000,  monthly earnings from these years are
first converted into 1996 values by deflating them with the CPI. Then initial capital in 1996
values is computed as: the number of service years times the average annual wage in 1996
values times the contribution  rate of 20%.  This value is then indexed forward from 1996 to
the appropriate  year (depending  on the year of retirement) in accordance  with the development
of the covered wage sum, i.e. the index normally used to determine the year-end value of
notional capital.
For older workers,  these transition  rules have the effect of basing most of the pension on
the last  few years  earnings  - in effect,  a classic  DB rule.  The  criticism of  this type of
benefit  rule  is  that:  (a)  it  disproportionately  benefits  those  with  sharper  age-earmings
profiles,  and  (b)  it  discourages  contributions  in  the  younger  years.  For  Latvia  at  the
transition,  these criticisms are not very  important.  There is no way or reason to influence
past behavior,  and in the Soviet period, age-earnings profiles were very flat for all workers
(especially in the post-inflation currency).  For younger workers,  the transition rules have a
small impact.
Indexation  of benefits.  Benefits are indexed twice a year following the development of the
consumer  price  index.  From  the year  2000  the law  calls  for  indexation based on  both
wages and prices. The exact form is yet to be decided,  but Ministry calculations are using
25-50 percent of the change in the wage sum.
I The  contribution  wage  is the wage on which  contributions  are actually  based. It thus takes  into  account
evasion  as well  as ceilings,  and so is usually  lower  than  the  economy-wide  average  wage
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Disability.  A  new  disability  benefit  was  also  designed  to  complement  the  new  old-age
pension.  In designing a  disability benefit  formula,  it was recognized that a benefit  which
depended  only  on  contributions  (accumulations  in  the  notional  account),  would  give
inadequate  insurance coverage for younger workers.  Instead, disability benefits depend on
the last 5 years of contributions and total years of service. A second key decision was what
was being insured  against - disability during working years and longevity for the disabled,
or just disability during working years. It was decided that the disability system only covers
the working  age period.  At age 60, those on disability begin to receive an old age pension
(which lasts until they die).  The old age benefit is the old age benefit calculated according
to the standard formula or the disability benefit itself, whichever is greater.  If the disability
benefit exceeds the old age benefit,  the difference is to be financed by a transfer from the
disability  fund to the old age pension fund.  Any  surviving minor children  at the time  of
death are entitled to a regular survivors pension well.
The three categories of disability (degrees of loss of capacity to work) from the old system
were  preserved,  as were  the  assessment  procedures.  The  new law  increased  the benefit
levels  of  severely  disabled  persons  who  need  attendant  care,  (Group  I)  and  the  less
seriously  disabled with  no work capacity  (Group II), but  decreased  the benefit  level  of a
group of persons who normally  work, but have some form  of physical impairment  (Group
III). The latter benefit is now a form of income supplement for the handicapped who work.
The formulae were designed so that the net financial effect on the budget would be neutral
if  there  was no  change  in assessment  procedures,  and  so that  conversion to  an  old  age
pension would not result in a lower benefit in most cases.
The benefit formulas are:
Group I:  0.45 * the individual average contribution wage  +  (service years/45)  * 0.1
* the individual average contribution wage.
Group II:  0.40  * the individual average  contribution wage  +  (service  years/45)  *
0.1  * the individual average contribution wage.
Group III:  the minimum pension.
The individual average contribution  wage is the average  of the individual's  own wage on
which contributions were paid for the best 36 months of the 60 months preceding the time
of the grant.  No benefit  can exceed five times  the minimum  wage (at current  levels this
would be a limit of 2 times the average wage).  Persons disabled prior  to entering the labor
force are entitled to the guarantee level.  There  are also minimum guarantees of  1.6 times
the  minimum  pension  for  Group  I  and  1.4  times  the  minimum  pension  for  Group  II.
Benefits follow the same indexation as old age pensions (price indexation through  1999 and
wage/price indexation from the year 2000).
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regardless of the type of old-age  system a country chooses. Within the NDC framework, it
is  possible to  impute individual earnings during disability, that is create a  formula to
provide an estimate of earnings foregone during disability  periods preceding the minimum
retirement age.  The  disability system can  then  finance old-age contributions during
disability  periods (money is transferred to the old-age system)  and the old-age benefit can
be calculated  using these contributions  to notional  capital.
Latvia has chosen a variation on this theme. In the Latvian legislation,  notional capital for
the disabled is based on (imputed  earnings equal to) the minimum  wage. Upon reaching the
minimum age for an old-age benefit, the beneficiary is entitled to  retain the disability
benefit or claim the old-age benefit depending  on which is the large of the two. Since the
contribution  to notional  capital for the disabled is based on the minimum  wage - instead of
some estimate of "normal" future earnings forgone - the entitlement  to the highest of the
two benefits  clearly helps the long-time  disabled  to receive a reasonable  benefit even in old-
age.  On the  other hand there is  a  negative incentive here for older workers if  they
anticipate  that a disability  benefit can leave them better of in old-age than they would be by
working all the way to the minimum  pension  age.
Survivors.  Survivor benefits were also restructured to conform to the notional account
principles. Benefits are related to the value of notional  capital in the account  (see Table 2).
The survivors  benefit is restricted  to minor children. A minimum  survivor's pension is also
specified to protect the families of those who die young. Survivor pensions for spouses
were eliminated in the new pension system. This is because for the prime working years
(age 25-50) labor force participation  is almost as high for women as it is for men. On
average, 91 percent of men in this cohort were in the labor force in 1997, compared with
about 84 percent of women. Given the 8-year difference  between life expectancies  in Latvia
(in favor of women) and the tendency  of men to marry younger women, this benefit was
almost always received by women. But as most of these women are working and eligible
for a pension of their own, this benefit was seen as an unnecessary  subsidy, especially for
spouses  without  children.
REFORM  OF TAx COLLECTION
Legislation regulating the social tax was also reformed during this period. Four major
changes were introduced. First, a ceiling and floor for covered earnings were added. The
purpose of the ceiling was to limit liabilities of the state system, and make room for
privately managed  pensions. The ceiling  is set by the Government,  and is currently at about
6 average wages per year.  The floor functions mainly as  a presumptive minimum for
agriculture, since Latvia has a minimum  wage, and is currently set at 6 monthly minimum
wages (or 1/2 of the minimum  wage per month).
Second, the self-employed  and persons employed in agriculture were made exempt from
coverage for  unemployment and work  injury,  lowering their payroll  tax  by  several
percentage points, and those above the minimum pension age were made exempt from
unemployment and disability coverage. A 5-year schedule for gradually lowering the
14payroll tax and transferring  the responsibility  for payment  of half the tax to the employee
was  also  adopted.  However,  in  1996,  the  Ministry  of  Welfare,  faced  with  growing
collection problems, amended the legislation to make both changes all at the same time, but
to postpone the lowering of the tax until 2001 (with  a provision  that Cabinet could lower
the payroll tax prematurely  if collections improved).  As a  result,  the payroll  tax will fall
from 37 percent to 33 percent in 2001, and the employee's  share will rise from 9 percent to
16.5 percent of covered wages. While it should be less disruptive to change the share all at
once (i.e.  there can be a one-time adjustment of wages),  the postponement  of the payroll
tax decline seems  in  retrospect  to  have been  a  mistake.  Once  collections  improved,  the
Government was pressured to give pension increases instead of tax rebates.
Third,  the collection  of taxes was  transferred  from  the  State Social Insurance  Agency  -
SSIA - (under  the Ministry  of  Welfare)  to  the  State Revenue  Service  - SRS  - (which
reports to  the Ministry  of Finance.  The reason  for this  change was that tax collection  in
Latvia (as in all transition economies)  was very  weak,  as the function in the Government
had  to be  created from  scratch.  Major  issues such as the creation  of a unique  system of
taxpayer numbers had to be solved. Protocols to handle large debts (where a workout and a
settlement would be  needed)  had to  be  developed,  and  staff  needed to  be  trained  in tax
collection functions  such as auditing  In  January  1996,  the stock  of  tax debts  for  social
taxes (e.g.  taxes declared but not paid) stood at 4.2 percent  of GDP,  and for all other taxes
at  5  percent.  Estimates  of  evasion  ran  even  higher.  At  the  same  time,  since benefits
depended on actual contributions,  many were  losing  out  on their  benefits when evidence
could  not  be  found  that  the  employer  paid  the  contributions  in  full.  Employers  were
unhappy as well, since they had to comply with two sets of regulations and respond to two
agencies.
The SRS was receiving significant technical  assistance from a number of sources that was
beginning to pay off (for example, a special unit to try to handle large taxpayers was being
created).  Providing  the same assistance  to  the SSIA  to  build  up  their  functions  seemed
wasteful.  In addition,  the SSIA was striving to develop  itself as a  client-oriented benefits
payment  and  fund  management  agency,  and  this  task  was  enough,  given  the  massive
changes in the system that had been legislated. Collecting taxes was proving overwhelming
for the SSIA, especially as the collection  was decentralized  to local offices and there  was
little management time available for central oversight. Conflicts were also arising internally
over  whether  it  was  better  not  to  collect  taxes  to  keep  people  employed  and  off
unemployment. Tax competition was also arising  in the case of insolvency or liquidation.
As debts continued to rise,  the decision was taken by Government to transfer collection to
the SRS. A project  was initiated to  prepare the transfer.  Tax legislation was also aligned
between the social tax and the  income tax to  facilitate  this  move.  Although  there was  a
rough transition,  by end-1998 all tax debts in the economy as a whole were declining (See
Murray and Fox, forthcoming).
As part  of the  reform  of tax  legislation,  the  tax  treatment  of  pension  income  was  also
revised.  Social tax payments are exempt  from  all taxes.  Pensions granted  under  the new
law are  taxed above  a  minimum,  (today equal  to  about  2/3  of the  average  wage).  The
15purpose of this was to  "claw back" pensions from working pensioners, treating pension
income similarly  to other income.
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
New budgeting  procedures. Complementing  the policy reforms were changes in budgeting
procedures and the institutional structure of fund management. Legally, the earmarked
payroll taxes are now collected  into 4 funds: the pension  fund (funds earmarked  for pension
and survivor's insurance  liability), the maternity, sickness  and disability  insurance  fund, the
unemployment  benefit fund, and the occupational  injury and diseases fund. Together, these
funds are known as the Social Insurance  Budget (SIB), which is a legally separate account
at the Treasury, with the right to retain surpluses. The amount of the payroll tax allocated
to  each fund is  set annually in the  SIB budget approved by  Parliament. Current and
expected future allocations  (factoring  in the tax decline  expected in 2001) are shown below:
Box 6:  Latvia - Contribution Rates to Individual Funds
Current  2002-2010
Pensions  and Survivors  27.5  24.
Sickness,  Maternity,  Disability  6.5  6.0
Unemployment  3.0  3.0
Total  37.0  33.0
Source: Table 3
It should be noted that regardless of how much is allocated  to the pension fund in reality,
only 20 percent goes into the notional  account. The rest is used to finance the pension  debt
from the old system. Old-age pensions and survivors insurance currently cost almost 28
percent of payroll. Administrative costs for the entire social insurance system are  1.5
percent of payroll (included  in the contribution  rate to each fund).
Creation  of  the  State  Social  Insurance  Agency.  Latvia's  policy  reforms  were
complemented  by a reform of the social insurance institutions. At the beginning of the
reform, all the social insurance functions  were performed by the "Social Insurance  Fund",
which was a department  of the ministry. It was ill prepared for the tasks required under the
reform. The organization  was poor, personnel  management  was weak, and key departments
and skills were missing (e.g. process management,  budgeting, evaluation, communication
and public relations, modem accounting  and financial  control. The information  system was
very weak and being upgraded without a strategic plan, resulting in poor hardware and
software purchase  decisions.
Senior staff at the "Fund" had been involved in the design of the reform, and they were
aware of the need for change in the organization. In the spring of 1995, an organizational
diagnostic was performed, which highlighted  the weaknesses  of the current structure and
management.  By the fall of 1995, business and IT development  plans had been prepared to
address these challenges, focused around transforming a civil service structure and culture
into,  a client-oriented  service agency. In January 1997, the agency was restructured into the
State Social Insurance Agency (SSIA), with a corporate organization and new personnel
16system. New departments were created, training  of staff and management commenced, and
offices were  re-organized.  Where  previously  clients  had  to  move from  office  to  office,
paperwork  in hand,  now a 'one-stop'  service couinter handled most cases,  saving time and
frustration.  Client feedback  surveys  vere  introduced  in all offices.  Contracts to purchases
new IT  and accounting systems were  signed in  ]L998.  When implemented,  these systems
should produce  substantial  staff  savings  as  well  as  finally  permit  the  SSIA  to  properly
monitor budgets, expenditures, assets and liabilities.
Despite Latvia's  efforts  to  develop  implementation  capacity,  the  implementation  of  the
reform did  not go  smoothly.  The  main bottleneck  was the  antiquated  IT  system,  which
meant that until  1998, most  offices did not have adequate computer  systems and pensions
were often calculated by hand. As the new formula was much more complex,  this involved
a lot of work. Office manuals and materials for the public, explaining the policies in simple
Latvian,  were  not  prepared  until  one  year  after  the  reform passed  Parliament.  The  first
year  of  implementation  was  chaotic.  Treatment  of cases  was  not  standard,  resulting  in
problems.  Since the philosophy  of the system was to rely heavily on incentives to change
behavior, this lack of information damaged the system's credibility.
T1E PUBLIC RESPONSE AND THE ROLLBACKS
For two years,  Ministry of Welfare efforts had  been directed towards formulating the new
legislation,  and  not  towards  implementation.  As  a  result,  when  the  reforms  were
implemented in  January  1996,  the agencies  were  poorly  prepared  to  administer the  new
system. No efforts were in place to communicate the new pension system to the population,
especially  those  about  to  reach  retirement  age.  Few  staff  in  the  local  offices  even
understood  the reforms.  Not  surprisingly,  those  who were  expecting  to  retire  below  the
normal age were especially surprised by their low benefit. Often they did not discover that
they would not receive the guaranteed minimum benefit until  after they had left their job.
Some had been on unemployment for the year before so their pre-retirement  wage was be
very low.
Other problems  with  the transition  rules  developed  as  well.  The  legislation called  for  a
ceiling on contributions,  which was expected to generate a ceiling on pensions.  However,
the Governent  delayed in implementing the ceiling as the social insurance budget was still
in  deficit and any loss of revenue  was to be  avoided.  As a  result,  the provision  to  value
pension capital based  on the past  year or  two  of average  contributions  provided  an even
stronger  incentive  to  contribute  than  was  expected  or  desired.  A  few  employees  near
retirement  age borrowed  money and made large  contributions.  Perhaps the most clear-cut
examples of "winners"  were persons with multiples of service year under the old law, e.g.
for years spent in extreme conditions in Siberia. In. these ways, a few gained entitlement to
a pension 6 or more times the average pension.
Not  surprisingly,  those  who  received  low  pensions,  e.g.  women  under  60,  protested
strongly to Parliament, using as political weapons the inequity of the benefits for those who
had gamed the system by making large contributions  in 1996.  Parliament responded by:
17*  imposing  a ceiling  on all pension  benefits of about 3 times the average  wage;
*  guaranteeing  that all those who had contributed during the first years after the
transition would have their capital valued the average wage, even if their own
wage was lower; and
*  extending 80 percent of the guaranteed minimum pension to those men from
certain occupations entitled to collect a pension below 60 under the transition
rules as well as to all women.
These changes restored some  of the redistribution  lost from the previous system. Providing
an enhanced safety net against low income was a  good idea,  particularly during the
transition period, when unemployment  was rising and collection problematic. We do not
have the data to check how many people benefited from this provision  and what their work
history was, but once the new computer system is in place and the work histories entered
into the system, this analysis  can be done.
The most troubling issue is the introduction  of the guarantee  for those who retire below 60
(all women are still eligible). If many of them continue to work, it is an unjustified  subsidy.
In  addition, they face the  risk of  low-income replacement when they do  finally quit
working. If those eligible take the opportunity to quit work -- perhaps because they live
with another earner, so current household income is acceptable -- the vulnerability  of the
household to poverty later rises. Better counseling and information for this group may
help, but OECD experience suggests that many people still retire as soon as they reach
minimum  pension age, even with incentives such as Latvia provides. Latvia is currently
reviewing  this provision.
THE  POLITICAL  PRESSURES  OF 1998
By  the  fall  of  1997, it  was  clear  that  the  reforms,  combined with  improved tax
administration,  had been successful  in restoring short-term fiscal balance. Cash revenues  in
the account were ready to be used for either a payroll tax or the second tier. But the second
tier legislation was not close to ready. The Government  was also running a surplus in the
state budget. With an election scheduled in the fall of  1998 and tensions rising in the
governing  coalition, the Government  came under pressure to spend. This included  using the
growing surplus in the social insurance  budget to give an ad hoc, extra benefit increase  to
pensioners, above the price indexation  provided for in the law.  The Government  complied,
first in October 1997 and again in March 1998, raising real pensions  substantially.
*  In  October  1997, the  Government shifted from  the  traditional "backward
looking" indexation  system to a forward-looking  indexation. In effect, effective
November 1,  pensioners were given a  double indexation - 4.1 percent for
inflation which had already taken place, and 3.1 percent for expected future
inflation. Inflation  for November - March turned out to be as forecast;
18*  In March  1998 the Government announced  additional indexations.  Pensions for
old pensioners  (taken before the new law) were raised  15.8 percent,  including
9.6 percent  to make  up for  indexatiorns not  granted  in  1995, when the budget
was  in  deficit.  Pensions  for  new  pensioners  were  raised  5.8  percent.  The
Ministry  of  Finance  projected  inflation  for  the  period  was  3.1.  (and  actual
turned out even lower).
The cumulative effect  of these decisions was to raise real old-age pensions on average by
15%.  As  a result,  the social insurance budget for  1998 was in deficit (using up reserves
from  1997).  While  the  system  should  return  to  surplus  in  2000,  considerably  fewer
resources  will be available to start the second tier.
Measures  taken  to improve public  unzderstanding.  The restructured  SSIA took a number
of  new  initiatives  in  1997 to  improve  public  understanding  and  acceptance  of  the  new
system.  By 1998, the staff had been trained and staff manuals prepared.  Media campaigns
based on focus group  information were undertaken.  Population surveys were developed to
measure  the  effectiveness  of  the  campaigns.  All  contributors  now  receive  contribution
statements once a year,  with an explanation of the system.  Once the new IT  system is in
place (January 2000),  this information will be available in local offices for all contributors,
who will also be able to calculate their future pensions.
The missing  link  in the' information campaign  is the overall  "why"  of the  system  - the
population  still lacks  information on the goals  of' the whole  3-tier  reform.  This  message
must come from the Government as a whole,  an(I not the State Social Insurance Agency.
Unfortunately,  Latvia's  fractured  governing coalitions have not been able to come together
on this point and prepare  a media campaign with  a clear message.  In part,  this is because
there  is  no  central  locus  for  reform preparation  (each ministry  has  its  own part  of  the
reform,  and  each  ministry  is  headed by  a  different  coalition  party).  It  also  reflects  the
overall  weakness  of  post-Soviet  countries  in  focusing  on  the  importance  of  public
communication.
Reforms  of 1999.  The fall in tax revenues associated with the Russia crisis has forced the
Government to reconsider the level of pension' spending once again,  and develop proposals
to restore  the original  intent of the reform  - to reduce expenditures.  The main proposals
under consideration include: (a) eliminating the early retirement option for women; and (b)
returning  to  backward-looking  indexation.  The  first  proposal  would  also  increase  the
strength of the system's  poverty protection, as it would ensure higher pensions for women
(who tend to spend their last years in life alone).  The Government is also considering an
increase in the minimum retirement age for both men and women to age 62.
PRIVATELY  MANAGED PENSIONS  - THE THiRD TIER
In 1996, the Government also completed the development of the regulatory  framework for
supervising private management of pension funds, submitting legislation to Parliament that
was  passed  in  1997.  The  law  permits  both  individual  and  employer  plans,  all  defined
contribution.  Contributions are exempt from both the income and payroll tax. Pension fund
19managers will be licensed  by the State Insurance  Inspectorate,  which has been expanded  to
handle additional regulatory  tasks. Licensed  pension  funds will make a contract with asset
managers, who are also licensed under complementary  legislation regulating investment
funds. Both laws took effect in July 1998. It is envisaged that the experience with the
regulation of voluntary pension schemes will be, in effect, the pilot stage for the second
tier, mandatory  program.
Investment  rules in the legislation are fairly liberal. The law sets limits on investments  in
securities  by one issuer, on real estate investments,  and on overseas investments  (5 percent
of  total).  Fund investments in  the  companies of  the  members or  the  managers are
prohibited  unless these are publicly traded shares. In this case they are subject  to the limits
above. The  regulator may issue  additional regulations, however,  consistent with  the
objectives  of safety and security.
THE DEVELOPMENT  OF THE SECOND TIER
The legislative  process.  In keeping with the pension  concept, original first tier legislation
submitted  to Parliament  had included  a provision calling  for the establishment  of the second
tier by 1998. However, in the last reading of the law, Parliament  struck out this provision.
The Ministry of Welfare nonetheless  tried to prepare the second tier legislation  consistent
with the  concept while  implementing the  first tier  legislation. Initial drafts were  not
satisfactory, as  the  inter-Ministerial cooperation needed  to  resolve  issues  was  not
forthcoming. Finally, in the summer of 1997, the Ministry of Finance agreed to take the
lead in preparing the legislation. The basic concept  was worked out, and draft legislation
was submitted  to Parliament in the fall of 1998.
Size of the second tier.  In preparing the draft legislation,  Latvia needed to make a number
of  key  choices, covering participation, financing, and  organization. Conunitted to  a
balanced budget, Latvia did not want to follow the lead of Poland and Hungary, and use
deficit financing  for the start. Therefore, the size of the second tier was left indeterminate
in the law, with the amount of the contribution  to be set by the government. The initial
allocation is expected  to be about 2 percentage  points, rising to 7 percentage points by the
year  2010.  To  provide  stability to  this  system, a  government decree  proposing the
contribution  path for the decade is now being prepared. Participation  will be mandatory  for
those under 30, and voluntary  for those age 30-49.
Investments and Management.  In the wake of the 1995 banking crisis (which involved
massive fraud in a major bank), there was substantial  opposition  from the Bank of Latvia
(the central bank) to the channeling of tax contributions  into the hands of private asset
managers. The original draft in the 1997 proposal called for one public monopoly asset
manager. Eventually, this opposition was overcome, and participants will be allowed to
chose among one public or several  private asset managers.
The same concerns at The Bank of Latvia have also led to inclusion of very restrictive
investment rules in the original draft legislation. The only investments  allowed would be
government-guaranteed  securities of Latvia, other Baltic states, and G10 and other EU
20countries. While these restrictions are  appropriate for  the  public  fund,  they  are  not
appropriate for all funds, as it will deny the Latvian private sector the long term capital
mandatory pension funds provide (except the  housing sector, which will benefit from
investments in mortgage-backed  securities). Given Latvia's  balanced-budget  philosophy,
most of the money will have to go overseas unless these restrictions are revised. It  is
expected that these restrictions will be relaxed for privately managed accounts, either
before the law is passed or shortly afterwards.
Most countries with mandatory funded systems offer a guaranteed rate of return on assets
in the accounts, despite the controversy  surrounding these guarantees. The current Latvia
legislation does not offer any guarantees. Given the restrictive investment rules and the
option of  a  state fund,  it  was not  felt that  any  additional guarantees were  needed.
However, if the investment  rules are relaxed for privately managed funds, this policy may
also be revised. Latvia is also giving consideration  to some form of fraud insurance.
Governance  of the state asset manager is a key issue now being debated. As the state asset
manager is a special department  of the Treasury (who issues Latvian government papers),
conflict of interest can arise with respect to investment  policy. In addition, the state asset
manager's overseas investments must be managed carefully to avoid loss of assets from
excessive foreign exchange risk (Latvian currency could appreciate). The lack of financial
market acumen in a transition country makes th[e creation of  an independent governing
board difficult. The legislation calls for a sub-committee of the cabinet of ministers to
review investment  plans every year.
Benefits.  As second tier benefits are considered part of the mandatory old-age system,
lump sum benefits are not allowed. Purchase of an annuity is  required, either from a
licensed  private supplier  or the govermnent  (on the same terms as a first tier benefit, that is
with wage/price indexation). If a  contributor dies before retirement, the balance in the
account is used to contribute  towards the general suarvivor  benefit under the first tier.
Administration. To reduce administrative  costs, the  'clearing  house" approach will be
adopted (Box  7).  The  SSIA will  in  effect  function as  a  pension  fund,  with  asset
management contracted out.  Contributions will be collected by  the tax  authority, and
passed on to the SSIA. The SSIA will be responsible  for:
*  collecting  information  from those eligible to participate on their choice of funds;
*  channeling  contributions  to the asset manager selected by the participant;
*  reporting to  participants regularly on  the  value of their  portfolio, based on
information  provided by asset manager; and
*  serving as an annuity supplier of last resort (offering annuities on the same basis
as first pillar annuities, including  indexing  provisions).
21Licensing and  supervision of  asset managers will be  responsibility of  the  Securities
Commission  (SC), which has the same responsibility  in the private system. It has the power
to  regulate the  industry, to  monitor transactions and  to  intervene in  case  of  any
irregularities. It will also be responsible for insuring that the information  provided to the
agency and directly to participants  (through public advertising, for example)  is correct and
not misleading.
Information  management at the SSIA.  Setting up the information  management  system in
the SSIA will take at least 18 months. The information system project is expected to be
completed  in 20004.  Therefore, in the first year of operation, participants will not have a
choice of asset managers. All funds will be channeled to a public asset manager in the
Treasury. After the first of operation, participants will have choices. Those who do not
choose will be automatically  assigned  to the public fund.
'  The SSIA's highest  priority is to get current benefit  payment  systems  transferred  over to the new system  by
November, 1999,  to avoid Y2K problems  plaguing  the current software  now in use (see above).
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23II.  ECONOMIC  IMPACTS  OF THE  SOCIAL  INSURANCE
REFORM
Improving the microeconomic incentives and macroeconomic outcomes of the  pension
system was  one of the main goals of the reform. In this section we analyze how close
Latvia came to achieving  these goals through a series of simulations. First  the effects for
individuals  of different incomes are simulated, to identify  the winners and losers, and how
strong the micro-incentive  effects actually are. Next, the short, medium and long term
fiscal effects are simulated.  The savings  achieved (or lost) from various parts of the reform
package  are identified. Finally, the stability of the system over the next fifty years relative
to the pre-reform system is analyzed.
Modeling  pension systems is always a challenge, but it is especially tricky in a transition
economy, for two reasons. First, the data systems were organized around the state sector,
and only in the last few years have they been redirected at the broader economy. As a
result, the historical  data on individual  and aggregate  behavior is poor. But even if it were
excellent, functions fitted to these data might still not be of much use in predicting the
future given the rate of change. For example, what assumptions should be used regarding
the future distribution  of income, the development  of the informal economy and future life
expectancy  in Latvia? The underlying official data on survival rates are very problematic,
as they show fluctuations  of  as much as 23 months from year to year (which is very
unusual). However, even in transition  countries  where the data collection  systems are better
and the data more stable, predictions on the future of life expectancy or birth rates are
uncharted territory. This is because patterns in the transition economies of Eastern and
Central Europe are quite different  than other countries (OECD or emerging  market). In our
analyses, we try to indicate sensitivities.  We also omit analyses we think are too uncertain
(for example, ones which depend on predicting  the future distribution of lifetime income,
given that we do not even know the current distribution). Notes on the simulations are
provided at the end of the text.
How  Do  THE BENEFITS FOR INDIVIDUALS  COMPARE UNDER THE OLD AND
NEW SYSTEMS?
In the table below,  we have calculated the pension  in  terms  of average  1996 wages  for
persons covered completely within the NDC system (e.g.  ignoring the effect of the second
tier and the transition  rules ( Box 8 ).  We assume the person contributes  the whole time,
which means 42 years of contribution at age 60, 47 years at age 65, and 52 years at age 70,
using as the imputed wage the expected average contribution  wage for  1998. We compare
this simulated pension with what the same individual would receive under the old rules.  In
other words,  we  ignored the complications arising from  the transition  rules,  by assuming
that  persons  are covered  entirely according  to  either  the  new  or  the  old  rules.  We use
current  life expectancy estimates,  and we do not  consider  the impact of wage  growth in
raising pensions under either system. We considered three types of individuals:
*  someone whose lifetime wage equals the average wage;
24*  a  lifetime low  income worker, whose average lifetime wage is  1/2 of  the
average wage (resulting either from permanent low earnings perhaps because of
part-time  work or few years of service); and
*  a lifetime  higher income wvorker,  whose average wage is 1.5 times the average
wage.
Box 8:  Simulated Pension Benefits, Old and New Pension System
Age at Retirement
50  55  60  65  70
New System'  (Share of average wage)
Low wage  13  17  23  31  43
Average Wage  25  34  46  63  85
High wage  38  51  69  94  128
Old System
Low Wage  42  44  46  48  50
Average Wage  42  44  46  48  50
High Wage  42  44  46  48  50
New/old  (Percent)
Low Wage  30  38  50  66  85
Average Wage  59  77  98  129  170
High Wage  58  115  148  195  255
*  New  system  benefits  calculated  on the basis  of an average  life time wage  of 120 real 1998  lats (average  wage).
**  Old system  benefits  assumes  national  average  wage used to index  pensions  in 1998  would  be 120  lats.
+  The guaranteed  minimum  is not included.  It is about 26 56  of the average  wage  in the new  system. The minimum  for those  who have
the right to retire  under 60 and choose  to exercise  this right is 80% of normal guarantee  minimum.
Assuming that  under  the old  system the  required  quarterly  indexation would  have taken
place 5,  most  new pensioners  with  full years  of  service  retiring  after  60 do  not  suffer  a
benefit  decline  compared  with  the  old  system.  For  those  who  work  longer,  benefits
increase  - as we have seen earlier  they more than double for those  who work another  10
years.  Early  retirees  will  be  penalized.  For  exarmple, a  woman  who retires  at  55  will
receive,  on  average,  a  25  percent  lower  pension  under  the  new  system  - if  she  stops
working and contributing.  Those who retire even earlier will suffer an even greater  loss of
benefits. It should be noted that owing to the transition  'safety net'  rules, the lower income
members of the transition  generation (born about 1.935-1950) will not suffer as much from
5 This is a  strong assumption.  Without a major increase in payroll taxes or other financing, future claimants
would not receive these benefits.  See the simulations of medium term effects (below).
25the loss of redistribution  in the new system, and the higher income members will do quite
well.
Benefits are also larger for those with higher incomes, reflecting the more direct link to
contributions in the new system. Benefits are possibly smaller for those whose lifetime
incomes are low. The lifetime  poor should, in principle be covered by the guarantee, to the
extent that their situation  is not a result of poor health - in which case they are probably on
disability benefits,  and  will  normally receive a  higher benefit  than  guarantee. The
disadvantage  of the contribution-related  formula is that it is not redistributive  within the age
cohort towards persons with low earnings 6. However, given that the  old  system was
unaffordable,  the projected  benefits under the old system are probably on the high side (see
below).
THE  FISCAL IMPACT OF THE SOCIAL INSURANCE  REFORM
One of  the  main  goals of  the  reform was to  reverse the  upward trend  in  pension
expenditures, and create a system that is affordable  for the next generations. These goals
were to be achieved despite a projected  increase in life expectancy  and a short-term  fertility
crash (expected  to return to roughly replacement  rate by 2010) - resulting  in an increase in
the  projected  old-age  dependency ration  over  the  coming  half  century,  increasing
expenditures  and decreasing  the contribution  base. Will these goals have been achiever, and
at what price? First we consider the medium  term goal of  stabilizing  and reducing  pension
expenditures  relative  to GDP, and then we consider long-term  system stability.
MEDIUM  TERM  OUTcoMEs
In the first years of the reform the goal of reversing the upward trend in expenditures was
in sight. In  1997, the system ran a surplus equal to 0.7 percent of GDP (Table 3). Without
the  extra  indexations  of  1997-98,  the projected  social  insurance  budget  would  show  a
surplus  in  2000  of about 0.9  percent  of  GDP instead of  a deficit  of about 0.2  percent.
Despite the  fiscal effects of the  1997-98 indexations,  the reform  had  an  important fiscal
impact. Total expenditures  in percent  of GDP have stabilized, and are expected to remain
essentially constant through the year 2000. But revenues have declined as a percent of GDP
since 1995 due to a decline in the number of contributors in 1996 and 1997.
Revenues are projected  to  decline again the period 2000-2005,  creating  a cash  deficit in
2002 when the reduction  in the overall contribution rate to from 37 to 33 percent  begins.
Both pension  and other benefit  expenditures will also decline during  this period.  A small
cash surplus develops after 2002, and this is intended to go to the creation the 2nd tier of the
mandatory  old-age  pension  system.  By the  year  2007  an  amount  corresponding  to  an
overall  contribution  rate  of  around  4  percent  can be  allocated  for  this  purpose  without
incurring any debt, allowing a debt-free contribution rate of at least 6 percent of payroll by
6  Persons with low earnings are frequently  who do not work full time.  Note that indexation  based on the
average development  of contributions  is , however, to the advantage  of persons whose earnings grow less
rapidly  than the average.
262007, as not all age cohorts will participate.  If government is able to eliminate completely
the early retirement for women during this period, the surplus will be even larger.
Box 9:  Projected Social Insurance  Revenues and Expenditures,  1995-2005.
Percent of GDP
1995  2000  2005
Total  Revenues  12.4  11.5  10.3
Social Tax  12.4  11.4  10.2
Transfers from  state budget  0.0  0.1  0.1
Total Expenditures  11.7  11.7  9.6
Old-age Pensions  7.7  8.3  6.7
Other Benefits and Administration  3.9  3.4  2.9
Cash Surplus  0.7  -0.2  0.8
Source:  Table 3
The reform  did  bring  substantial  savings relative  to  the  old  system.  Box  10 shows  the
sources of improvement  in greater  detail. Both arn increase  in revenues and a reduction in
benefits relative to the old system are projected.  The main sources of the savings are:
*  Indexation:  Even with  the large  real  increase granted  in  1998,  and  with  real
increases  in pensions from 2000  - part wage,  part price  indexation instead of
100%  price  indexation  - this  measure  accounts  for  30  percent  of  the  total
savings by 2005;
*  Other  legal  changes:  The  switch  to  the  new  pension  formula,  by  reducing
benefits for early retirees,  provides 20 percent of the savings;
*  Incentive  (behavioral)  Effects:  Postponed  retirement  decreases  pension
expenditures.  The decline  in  evasion  increases  social  insurance  expenditures.
The net effects produce expenditure savings amounting to  13 percent of the total
projected  savings.  Revenues  are  increased  by  both  longer  work  careers
(postponed retirement) and decreased evasion. These effects account together for
35 percent the projected total effect.
Of the effects  shown,  the behavioral  effects are obviously  more  speculative,  and  deserve
comment. Note that for the baseline scenarios used in the long-term analysis below,  we do
not incorporate these effects. Why do we nonetheless think these savings will occur? With
respect  to  the retirement  age,  even with  absolutely  no  information  provided  to potential
new pensioners,  the  average pension  age  is increasing  and  the  number  of new pensions
granted is decreasing.  In countries with similar incentives built into their systems -- that is
high  actuarial  increments and low marginal taxation of earnings  -- over 40 percent  of the
population  age  60-64  works  full  time  (Gruber  and  Wise,  1999),  whereas  in  Latvia  the
27participation rate is only 27 percent in this age group.  So even if they take the pension,  we
expect  an  increasing  share  of this  age group  to  continue  to  work  (generating  at least  a
revenue  effect).  In  addition,  in  OECD  countries  those  who  do work  tend  to  be  higher
income,  whereas  we  have  assumed they  are  average  income  thus  biasing  this  estimate
downwards.
Box 10:  Breakdown of the Fiscal Effects of Pension Reform
(millions of 1997 lats)
2000  2005
Effect on Total Revenues  24.4  61.0
Share of GDP  0.6%  1.1%
Breakdown of revenue effects:
State  budget transfers  to the pension  system  3.0  3.9
Postponed  retirement  9.1  28.4
Decline in evasion  12.3  28.7
Effect on Total Outlays  -24.1  101.9
Share of GDP  -0.6%  -1.9%
Breakdown of expenditure effects:
50 % wage indexation  of pensions  -9.5  -48.2
New old-age  pension  system  -3.9  -32.0
(with unchanged retirement age)
Postponed  retirement  -11.9  -28.7
Decline  in evasion  1.2  7.0
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With respect to the coverage effect (decline in evasion),  currently  about 72 percent  of the
estimated labor force participates in the social insurance system.  Our estimates project this
to rise to about 74 percent of labor force by 2005. While  it is true that pension  systems in
Latin  America  have not  realized  large  coverage  gains  after  moving  to  systems  that  tie
28benefits more tightly to contributions,  we are more optimistic for Latvia.  This is because
unlike  in  Chile,  collections  remain  centralized.,  and  major  efforts  are  underway  to
modernize the tax system (see above). These have already paid off, even though the system
is  not yet  automated and  most  of  the training  and  management  improvements are  ahead
(Murray and Fox,  1999).
The second reason is the nature of the uncovered sector. We have recently done an analysis
of  the  labor  force  based  on  new  labor  force  survey  data,  which  uses  ILO-approved
definitions  for constructing  variables  Survey data  report total  unemployment at about  15
percent  in 1998, compared  with about 7 percent  registered  at employment offices. A large
share  of the uncovered  (perhaps  50 percent)  are  probably unemployed,  but not registered
and not receiving benefits (they are probably ineligible owing to duration of spell or lack or
prior contributions).  As privatization completes and the economy recovers from the Russia
crises,  we expect Latvia's  uncovered unemployment rate to decline from about 9 percent of
the labor force to about 3 percent.
Will these savings be realized and distributed to fiuture generations,  given the trends of the
last  two  years,  or  will  they  be  distributed  to  current  pensioners?  Our  projections  are
optimistic on this  point.  It should be  noted that  the projected  decline in the payroll  tax
(required  by law) should provide  a brake  on the tendency  of Parliament to  distribute  the
savings to pensioners,  since this money will not come into the budget, and they would have
to  raise  taxes  to  get  it.  The  creation  of  the  second  tier  (expected  in  2000)  and  the
introduction of some form of modified price and wage indexation will provide an additional
counterweight,  in  part  improving  the  standard  of  pensioners  while  at  the  same  time
directing the cash surplus to savings.
LONG  TERM  MACROECONOMIC  STABILITY
The long-term goal of the Latvian reform has been to create financial solvency in the social
insurance  system,  at a  lower  tax  rate.  Currently,  old-age  and  survivors'  pensions  plus
administration of these benefits cost about 27.5 percent  of covered wages. Latvia's  goal is
to  get this  cost down to,  on  average,  about 23 percent  of covered wages (20 percent  for
pensions,  1 percent  for  survivors,  and 2 percent  for  administration  and reserves).  This is
the  amount  Latvia  would  like  to  allocate  on  average  to  old-age  security  from  current
covered income and would correspond  to what is credited into the notional account. Baring
major  economic  or  demographic  shocks,  this  should  provide  a  pension  of  about  50-60
percent  of final earnings for  12-14 years  ( the expected average post-retirement  lifespan).
Latvia also needs to build up a reserve against demographic and economic shocks.
Long  term  system  stability and  solvency  requires  the ability  to  withstand the  shocks to
which  pension  systems,  especially  public  PAYGO  system,  are vulnerable.  Systems that
cannot respond to shocks cannot achieve the goal of improving  old-age security.  Latvia's
pre-reform  system could not withstand the important shocks without a new financial crisis,
requiring  a major reform  or an increase in contributions.  The simulation below shows that
the  new  system  is  much  more  stable,  allowing  pension  costs  to  remain  close  to  the
individual NDC contribution rate of 20 percent.
29Box 11 compares the results  for new and old PAYGO systems. Expenditures are shown as
a  share  of  GDP.  To  make  the  systems  most  comparable,  no  behavioral  responses  to
incentives  to  delay  retirement  are  assumed.  In  addition,  the  pension  age under  the old
system is assumed age 55 for women and 60 for men. Both systems were subjected to the
following shocks:
. Longer  life  expectancy  (higher  survival  rates),  which  increases  pension
expenditures; and
*  Low coverage which decreases revenues without decreasing liabilities in the old
PAYGO  system  (shown  in  the  inverse,  as  a  positive  shock  to  the  baseline
PAYGO  scenario).
Under the most pessimistic  scenario  (no improvement  in coverage,  survival rate  increase
gradually),  the  results  are most  striking.  The new  PAYGO  system  is still able to  lower
expenditures to the target of 20 percent of payroll - or about 7 percent of GDP - while the
old  system would have to  raise contribution rates to  50 percent  of payroll - or about  17
percent of GDP.  Under the most optimistic scenario, expenditures in the old system would
still be only slightly under  15 percent of GDP, requiring a large increase in the payroll tax
to eliminate the system deficit.
Stability is insured  in the NDC  system in part by the maintenance of reserves.  These are
needed to  address the  gradual  increase  in liabilities Latvia  faces as the population  ages.
With  the  growth  of  the  second  tier,  (the  maintenance  of  reserves  in  the  NDC  system
earning a market rate of return)  by 2035, the reserves are estimated at about 20-40 percent
of GDP.  If these reserves  are not maintained,  contribution rates would have to rise in the
NDC  system.  This is one of the key purposes of the second tier.  Note that if the rate  of
return  on second  tier  funds is higher  than the projected rate  of growth  of wages,  actual
pensions  will  be  even  higher.  Our  projections  completely  ignore  this  dimension  of  the
pension reform.
How does the new system maintain  stability? In the NDC system, entitlements and, hence,
benefits are linked to contributions.  There are three important mechanisms at work. First,
non-compliance  results  in  commensurately  lower  entitlements  in  the  NDC  system.  For
example,  if  only  72  percent  of  earnings  are  reported,  then  this  is  the  basis  for  actual
payments.  In the old system,  years  of  service and the  economy-wide wage at retirement
determined  an individual's  benefit.  Simply paying contributions  at the minimum wage was
enough  to get benefits.  Second,  the NDC formula takes life expectancy from the pension
age into account. Benefits will decrease  gradually as longevity increases,  if people do not
work longer (in our simulation, about 6 percent by 2050). In the old system, pension costs
simply increased as people lived longer.  Third, the new system has a combination of wage
and price indexation, which helps to provide stability as the labor force contracts.
30Box 11.  Projected Old-Age Pension Expenditures
Year  2000  2010  2020  2030  2040  2050
THIE  NEW NDC PAY-AS-YOU-GO  SYSTEM
1.1 Present (72%) coverage  and
baseline survival rates
Total expenditures*  8.7%  6.7%  6.1%  5.8%  5.6%  5.7%
Average benefit  (lats)  52.8  59.3  60.9  65.2  72.3  81.6
System dependency  ratio**  67.2%  73.6%  89.7%  97.4%  104.1  %  114.0%
1.2. Present (72%) coverage and
high survival rates
Total expenditures*  8.6%  6.6%  6.3%  6.2%  6.1%  6.1%
Average benefit  (lats)  51.8  56.4  57.4  61.1  68.0  76.9
Systemdependencyratio**  67.5%  76.4%  99.2%  111.4%  119.1%  128.3%
1.3. Gradual increase in coverage  to 90% by 2019 and
Baseline survival rates
Total;  expenditures*  8.8%  7.0%  7.0%  6.9%  6.9%  7.0%
Average benefit  (lats)  53.0  62.5  70.3  78.2  88.0  99.9
System dependency  ratio**  65.4%  65.7%  71.7%  77.9%  83.3%  91.2%
THE OLD PAY-AS-YOU.-GO  SYSTEM
2.1  Present (72%) reporting of earnings and
baseline survival rate
Totali  e  nd0'9,'  7pdue8%  7.0%  '7.0%  6.9%  6.9%.  7.0%
Average benefit  (lats)  53.7  75.9  109.1  140.2  172.7  210.9
Systemdependencyratio**  67.2%  73.6%  89.7%  97.4%  104.1%  114.0%
2.2.  Present (72%)  coverage  and
high survival rates
Total expenditures*  8.9%  8.9% '  2.0%  14.2%  154%  16.6% 
Average benefit  (lats)  53.7  75.8  108.4  139.7  173.0  211.2
System dependency  ratio**  67.5%  76.4%  99.2%  111.4%  119.1%  128.3%
2.3  Gradual increase in coverage  to 90% by 2019
baseline survival rates
Total expljtues*;  ,, ,0000,0t,08.9,%t:<-  ,g,008.7%',0<,j,  i;,,110%.'  %4<000'f,0,010255%  13.5%V 2  14 7%  ,
Average benefit  (lats)  53.8  76.9  110.2  140.4  172.7  210.9
System dependency  ratio**  65.4%  65.7%  71.7%  77.9%  83.3%  91.2%
*  Share of projected GDP
t*  Pensionlcontributors
Notes:  1. See Annex  I for assumptions.
2.  Benefits in the old system are indexed by the r  ate of growth of the per capita wage. In the NDC system NDC capital is
indexed by the wage sum on which contributions are paid. Benefits are based on a 'Swiss  index" of 50 % prices and 50 %
wage sum. Average benefit in Lats per month in  1997 prices.  All pensioners are assumed to retire at the pre-reform
retirement ages of 55 for women and 60 for men.
The impact of indexation of benefits. The most important factor  insuring sustainability  is
the impact of different  indexation provisions  on pension benefits.  Under  the old  system,
benefits  were  wage  indexed.  Under  the  new  system  benefits  are  only  partially  wage
indexed.  In a period of real wage growth,  lifetime pension benefits under  the old  system
31would  be higher than under the new system. With real per capita wage  growth of 4 percent
per annum, wage indexation would give a benefit increase of almost 50 percent after 10
years. Wage sum growth would  give even more, to the extent that earnings  are increasingly
covered in the formal economy. On the other hand, this trend will be gradually  offset by an
expected  demographic-led  fall in the labor force. An increase  in coverage (up to 90 percent
of total labor income below the ceiling  by the year 2020) increases  the pension  through this
indexation. Depending on  the  demographics, using the wage sum as  an indexer may
produce higher pensions than using the per capita wage. In Latvia, our estimates indicate
that under current trends, around 2025 the per capita wage  begins to give higher indexation
than wage sum as an indexer. However, indexation  with the contribution  wage sum keeps
the system in financial  balance with the steady decline in the labor force, given the decline
in the number of working aged persons in the present baseline  demographic  scenario.
Box 12: Projected  Old-Age  Pension Expenditures,  New Pay-As-You-Go  System
Increasing  Pension Age
2000  2010  2020  2030  2040  2050
3.1  Present (72%) coverage and
baseline survival rates
Toual  expenditures*  8.3  5.3  5.0  5.7  5.7  57
Average benefit  54.2  68.6  90.0  108.8  123.1  137.2
System dependency ratio**  61.6  50.1  49.7  57.6  61.6  67.1
3.2  Present (72%) coverage and
high survival rates
Total Expenditure*  8.2  5.3  5.3  6.2  6.3  6.1
Average benefit  53.3  65.7  83.2  99.5  113.8  128.0
System dependency ratio**  61.9  52.4  56.7  67.9  73.0  77.8
* Share of projected  GDP
**  Pension/contributors
Notes:  1.  See Annex  I for assumptions.
2.  Benefits  in the old system  are indexed  by the rate of growth  of the per capita  wage. In the NDC  system  NDC  capital  is
indexed by the wage sum  on which  contributions  are paid.  Benefits  are based on a "Swiss  index"  of 50%  prices and 50% wage
sum.  Average  benefit  in Lats per month  in 1997  prices. All pensioners  are assumed  to retire  at the  pre-reform  retirement  ages
of 55 for women and  60 for men.
The calculations in Box 11 assume people retire at the old law pension ages of 55 for
women and 60 for men. Under the new system, the retirement  age of women will increase
to  60 by  2005  (assuming the early  retirement provisions are  removed). The average
retirement age could become even higher in the next half century if only a portion of
workers postpone their retirement longer. As a result, the simulations  in Box 11 understate
the average  pension and overstate the dependency  ratio (since the system is acuarially fair,
they do predict expenditures well). Simulations showing this behavioral response to  the
incentives  are shown in Box 12. The higher retirement age leads to a lower dependency
ratio and higher pensions  than the previous scenarios, but without significantly  affecting  the
cost expressed  as a percent of GDP.
32III.  CONCLUSIONS:  EVALUATI1ON  OF LATVIAN PENSION
REFORM
At this writing (August, 1999), Latvian pension reform is an unfinished work,  as  the
second tier is not yet in place. And the first tier has not been an unqualified  success, as the
constant pressures for change have shown. Nonetheless, the creation of the new, defined-
contribution  first tier pension  system in 1996  was a major achievement.  Compared with the
old system, the new system has been more affordable, equitable, and transparent. Adding
the regulatory framework for privately-managed  pension should stimulate  the development
of the capital market as well as provide additional  retirement  savings for middle and upper
income  households.
Affordability.  The reduction in entitlements  will allow pension expenditures  as a share of
GDP to  fall steadily over the  next ten years. Any impact of  the  incentives to  delay
retirement will provide an even greater short term  surplus. The  system will  still be
expensive, however, and will have to rely on irLter-generational  redistribution to pay the
costs. Even with these reforms, payroll taxes will remain high, financing transfers over the
medium term.  The normal payroll tax  rate today is  37  percent, paid  mostly by  the
employer. It will fall to 33 percent in 2002, and be shared equally between the employee
and the employer. The high costs of the system stem from the inheritance  of the past -- too
many people retired too early, and still have a strong political and economic claim on the
system. Major reductions in system cost at this point could only be achieved by cutting
back pensions already given -- an unlikely prospect in a democracy. However, Latvia's
payroll tax rate and projected expenditures  over the next 10 years will still be lower than
Poland or Hungary, the two reform leaders in Central and Eastern Europe. It will also still
offer an acceptable replacement rate, important in a transition economy where informal
family systems  eroded in the Soviet period.
Provided the system survives the political process intact, the NDC system offers a high
degree of expenditure stability and affordability compared with the old system. A major
reason  is the  automatic adjustments to demographic shocks, which lowers the  overall
systemic  risk of the PAYGO system.
Social Protection. The new pension system  will provide excellent income replacement  (50
percent of pre-tax earnings, 75 percent of net earnings after taxes) for those who contribute
at least 40 years, even if life expectancy  increases  by 10 percent. Popular discontent with
the system stems in part because this is lower than the promised replacement under the
Soviet system, but  this  system was unsustainaLble.  The  pension credit  for  spells of
unemployment, sickness, or time out of the labor force to care for children also provides
social protection  for important  segments  of the population.
A pure defined contribution approach may not oiffer  sufficient income guarantees for the
lifetime poor. The Latvian system includes a minimum  guaranteed pension at the level of
the social pension for all those over 60 who have contributed to the system for at least 5
years. This guarantee is set by the Government  and today is about 28% of the average age.
33The purpose  of this guarantee is to transfer  some of the cost of maintaining  the lifetime
poor elderly from the social assistance system (and the state budget) to the pension system
fund. The size of the transfer made will depend on the level of guarantee.  At the current
level of the social pension, few persons with over 25 years of service should be in need of
the guarantee. However,  if the guarantee level is increased in real terms (or the informal
sector balloons, with a large  number of non-contributors  for a  long time),  the guarantee
would become  more costly.  In this  case,  it would violate the key  principle  of  the  new
scheme -- a contributor only receives a benefit related to his or her contribution.
Should the guarantee be maintained? This is a complicated question. Some redistribution to
the elderly is necessary in any society. In a transition economy, relying on informal family
systems is not appropriate since the Soviet period broke this tradition, substituting formal
systems for  traditional transfers.  In  terms of  administrative costs,  the guarantee  may be
cost-effective,  as  it  saves  the  social  assistance  system  from  constantly  means-testing
someone who would normally not be expected to return to work. However,  it may not be a
very targeted social expenditure, since it does not depend on the income of the consumption
unit (e.g.  whether the pensioner lives with a working spouse or adult children,  how many
income-earning assets they own, etc.).  Since most pensioners in Latvia do not live alone,
the potential for  leakage to  higher income households  is high.  This  is the argument  for
reliance on the social assistance system for poverty alleviation, including for the elderly.
Guarantees also erode incentives to contribute for low income workers.  How important is
this in Latvia? With guarantee currently set well below the minimum wage, it should not be
a large disincentive, as most workers should not expect to be covered. For Latvia, the right
balance might  be  to maintain  the guarantee  at about the  current  level  in  real  terms.  A
budget transfer to cover the difference between the pension entitlement and the guarantee
could be instituted to increase the integrity of the contribution-based system.
Equity.  The  new  system  is  less  redistributionery  than  the  old  system.  Higher  income
workers get much more out of the new system  than the  old Soviet system.  In  the post-
Soviet world, this decrease in redistribution has strong political support.  It is the flip side
of one of the main tenants of the NDC system: that everyone is treated the same way, and
no one receives more than what they  (or the state on their  behalf) paid for.  The cost  of
reducing the labor market distortions of the payroll tax is the loss of redistributions.
Special  groups  which  had  favorable  treatment  under  the  Soviet  system  lose  out  (for
example,  ballet  dancers,  pilots,  and  all  the  other  groups  who  had  an  early  pension),
although  there  are  generous  transition  provisions  for  those  who  have  been  in  these
occupations at least 20 years.  Women who take the early retirement option are big losers
under the new system. Indeed, these women may end up quite poor as they live out their
expected 20+  year post-retirement  life span.  To  reduce this poverty  risk,  Latvia should
remove the early retirement option from the current system.
Costs associated  with changing demographics  are paid by the retiring generation.  The
new system permits a flexible adjustment of benefits to changes in life expectancy. This is
very important in transition economies such as Latvia, where current  high mortality rates
for men over 50 are not expected to continue into the next century. The new system can
34deliver  higher pensions now, with an automatic  adjustment as demographic trends change.
This  avoids the whole acrimonious  debate  over  retirement  age which has plagued Eastern
European countries.
Of course,  as life  expectancy  increases,  benefits  fall  for  a  given  level  of  contributions.
This happens whenever the annuity is "purchased"  at retirement.  However,  if benefits do
not fall as life expectancy increases,  then the burden  for the next generation grows until it
is unfmancable.  This is an increase  in intergenerational  equity offered by the NDC system.
It strongly reduces the need for  a large tax increase or a wrenching downsizing later,  thus
helping to protect future generations.
PROBLEMS WITH LATVIA'S  NDC  SYSTEM
Transition rule.  In any system,  this is one of the most difficult questions.  Since the main
purpose  of  reforms  is  to  cut  benefits,  it  is  difficult  to  be  fair  with  accrued  rights.  In
transition  economies  such as Latvia,  the problermL  is compounded  by the hyperinflation  of
the initial transition  years,  which  makes  the valuation  of these rights  almost impossible.
The Latvian choice  (recommended  by  the authors)  weighted  very  heavily  the first  years
after the passage of the law.  For those having good years,  this  seemed fine. But for those
nearing pension age and having bad years  (e.g.  spells of unemployment or non-payment of
wages and contributions) these years  weighted  heavily in the final pension,  in a way that
was  considered  unfair.  This  ultimately  led  to  Parliament-imposed  changes.  Since  the
earnings distribution  was quite  flat during  the Soviet years  (both with  respect to  age and
skill level),  a  better  choice  from  the  start  mighit have been  to  use  some  mixture  of the
economy-wide  average  wage  and  the  individual's  wage  to  value  the  capital.  Certainly
Latvia's  rule would pose problems  in a  normal  (non-transition) economy with more wage
dispersion (between age cohorts and lifetime).
Implementation burden.  Moving  to  a  contribution-related  system  involves  a  significant
investment  in  information  management.  Latvia  is  only  now  installing  the  information
technology  needed.  As  a  result  of this  lag,  the time  needed  to  calculate  new  pensions
stretched from about 10 working days before the reform to 40 days currently.  The new IT
system should eventually cut this time to  15 minutes.
Explaining pension  reform to  the population  is  nbot  a  simple task,  especially  for a young
agency  such  as  the  SSIA.  While  the  concept  of  the  NDC  system  is  quite  simple,  the
application,  with all the complexities  of the transition  rules,  is a mouthful at best.  At the
time the law was passed, no communications  or lTaining plan was in place.  Subsequently,
booklets were printed and television and radio spots were prepared,  but training of staff in
the regional offices only began a year after  the law passed. This  lack of basic information
and explanation  was surely one  of the factors  which  contributed  to public  dissatisfaction
with  the reform,  and the ensuing  counter-reform.  (Contrast this  with  Poland,  where  the
communications plan was in place before the design stage was complete).
Sequencing.  Latvia  prepared  the PAYGO  refoirm first,  in  response  to  fiscal pressures.
The next phases of the reform did not follow as quickly as had been envisaged.  Was this a
35result of poor sequencing? It is noteworthy  that Hungary  prepared the third pillar first, and
then the second and the first together. Poland prepared the third and second pillar reforms
first, and left the first pillar to last. However, both countries prepared and implemented
their PAYGO reforms well behind Latvia, and were not able to cut benefits over the
nearest decades as sharply as Latvia. It is probably too early to comment on sequencing,
and the  "big bang"  approach of  Poland and Hungary compared with Latvia's phased
approach. There is no question, however, that Latvia lost momentum after the PAYGO
reform,  and  the  implementation problems caused the  whole reform process to  lose
credibility.
Final thoughts.  Latvia's  NDC  reform  solved an  important long-term fiscal problem
because it provided a means to cut future benefits in a manner that was broadly perceived
as fair. It also improved incentives  to contribute by making benefits dependent  on lifetime
contributions,  thus reducing the labor market distortion from the mandatory  payroll tax. In
Latvia, the NDC  system fundamentally changed the tone of  the  debate. It  helped to
neutralize  many of the special groups  blocking pension  reform.
The NDC approach is not the only way to achieve these goals. Benefits dependent on
lifetime  contributions, for example, can be built into any PAYGO DB system as well (The
Hungarian, U.K., and U.S. systems are all examples). But in the post-Soviet  environment,
the NDC may be a good answer.
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37ANNEX 1:  GENERAL  SCENARIO ASSUMlPTIONS FOR  LONG TERM
PROJECTIONS
*  Contribution  wage growth: 1998: 8.9%; 1999:  5.1%; 2000-2001:  4.5 %; 2002-2005:
4.2%;  2006-2010: 4%;  2011-2015: 3.5%;  2016-2020: 3%; 2021-2050: 2%;
*  Arrears: Gradual  decrease  from  5  % (1998) to  2  % in the year  2010 as a result  of
improved tax collection;
*  Total social taxes  as a % of total earnings (old-age, disability, sickness, work injury,
unemployment,  maternity  and child care income benefits,  funeral benefit):  1997-2001:
ca 35  %, 2002-2050:  ca 32.2  %. Note the self-employed and working pensioners  pay
less and receive less coverage;
*  Coverage as a % of total  labor  force (scenario  1.3, 2.3):  1998:74  %; 2002:75  %;
2005:76  % with an approximate increase of one percentage point per year through year
2020. From year 2020 it remains at 90 %;
*  Pension Age:  Box 11: Women 55, Men 60. Box 12: Pension age .(baseline) Men 1996:
60;  1998:  61,  2002:62;  2011:64;  2018:65.  Women  1996:55;  1999:56;  2001:57;
2003:58; 2005:59; 2007:60; 2009:61; 2011:62; 2013:63; 2018-2050:64.
*  Fertility rate: 1998: 1.12;  2000:1.20;  with an increase of 0.80 per year through  2005
reaching  1.6;  and then by 0.60 per year through 2010 reaching  1.90 from  which there
is an increase of 0.10 per year through 2030 to 2.1, where it remains through 2050;
*  Survival  rates:  (life expectancy at age 60). The assumption in the  "High"  scenario is
that Latvians achieve the survival rates of Sweden in 1997 in the year 2015.
Year  2000  2010  2020  2030  2040  2050
Baseline  survival
Men  14.8  15.9  16.5  17.0  17.7  18.3
Women  19.7  20.6  21.1  21.5  22.0  22.5
High Survival
Men  15.4  18.2  19.9  19.9  19.9  19.9
Women  20.4  22.5  23.7  23.7  23.7  23.7
38TABLE 1:  LATVIA - CONSOLIDATED  SOCIAL INSURANCE  AND
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE EXPENDITURE,  1985 - 1999 (thsd. Lats)
1985  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  (est.)
Expenditure  3163.5  4325.5  14165.6  95611.8  214734.8  302287.5  346967.6  414552.0  448106.2  494497.2
Short-term benefits  540.5  641.5  988.9  6612.9  17629.0  23432.0  28634.3  29998.0  22051.5  31118.9
Sickness  allowance  430.5  534.5  782.2  3996.4.  7795.1  11765.0  15040.4  13647.6  3135.9  5778.8
Maternity  leave  97.0  96.5  164.9  1075.4  1738.3  2049.9  2449.1  2557.3  2688.5  3949.8
Birth  grant  13.0  10.5  30.1  162.2  375.5  827.3  1601.5  1848.6  2195.1  3316.8
Funeral  benefit  2.3  367.4  1040.8  1796.1  2104.7  2247.5  2516.3  3143.8
Unemployment  benefit  1000.3  6510.7  6854.8  7294.9  9576.0  11447.7  14708.9
Benefits  related  to disability*  18.3  160.2
Other  9.4  11.2  21632.3  138.9  143.7  121.0  49.7  60.6
Family  benefits  (total)  65.0  124.0  834.0  20232.4  36815.2  35336.8  34248.7  37114.5  38278.1  41473.7
Extended  maternity  leave  565.0  4710.7  8923.7  7825.9  7110.2  6526.9  5608.2  8272.7
Family  allowance  8.4  14990.0  27891.5  27510.9  27138.5  28652.4  30472.3  29973.9
Grant  for disabled  children  1935.2  2197.6  3227.1
Kindergarten  subst.  Allowance  260.6  531.7
Pensions  2491.5  3411.5  11193.5  62205.9  141129.6  199568.7  243808.5  302542.8  344146.8  405821.1
Old-age  pensions  8638.0  44346.9  90139.9  150222.3  181844.8  231467.7  268622.5  316107.9
Disability  pensions  1563.5  12422.6  19736.5  34770.5  43510.3  49661.1  52018.4  59703.5
Survivor's  pensions  537.5  2853.7  5406.9  8329.1  10404.6  12443.8  13558.1  15758.3
Service  pensions  454.5  106.8  236.4  585.2  709.4  2721.1  3167.6  4031.4
Social  pensions  1756.1  2840.8  3837.3  4672.9  3276.4  3264.7  4161.1
Min.  of Internal  Affairs  pensions  719.8  1305.4  1824.2  2666.5  2972.7  3515.5  6058.9
Employment  expenditures  915.7  210.2  1232.3  2639.8  2358.7  2186.8  2985.5  5086.0
Social  Assistance and Care  44.0  107.0  209.4  2142.3  13346.4  36343.0  31268.3  34390.8  31821.0
Social  Assistance  1404.3  10361.6  24785.5  14667.7  14751.2  13532.9  n/a
Social  Care  738.0  2984.8  11557.5  16600.6  19639.6  18288.1  n/a
Social  Insurance  24.1  3065.2  4582.3  4967.2  6649.1  8319.1  8823.3  10997.5
Administration
Other  expenditure  22.5  41.5  1142.9
Revenue  2751.5  4778.0  15210.3  102659.3  180315.1  265232.2  345981.5  384920.4  450733.3  487359.6
Social  tax receipts  1052.0  2210.0  14812.0  87385.8  165438.2  230130.0  289176.7  321970.1  383859.3  427678.4
Budget  transfers  1687.0  2555.0  4250.0  11698.3  25779.7  40545.7  42266.3  43810.9  49036.8
Municipal  budget  participation  1404.3  1648.2  4058.8  14667.7  14751.2  13532.9  n/a
Other  receipts  12.5  13.0  398.3  9619.2  1530.4  5263.7  1591.4  5932.8  9530.2  10644.4
Expenditure  In % of GDP  7.5%  6.9%  9.9%  9.5%  14.6%  14.8%  14.8%  14.7%  13,7%  13.1%
MEMO  Item:
GDP  42220.0  62440.0 143325.0 1004555.0 1467012.0  2042555.0  2349223.0 2829135.0  3275500.0  3777500.0
- due  to accident  in  workplace  and/or  professional  disease
39TABLE 2:  LATVIA: OLD  AND  NEW PENSION LEGISLATIVE  PROVISIONS
CATEGORY  OLD LAW  NEWLAW
Old  age pensions  Law  on  State Pensions.'  Law  on State  Pensions'
11129190,  original  law  Effective  111/96
Formula  P= (0.3*W)  + (W*0.004*L)  P= K/G
P= pension  K=  pension  capital  of  insured,
W= nat'l  average  wage  for prev.  quarter  composed of imputed and registered
L= total  length  of service  social  insurance  contributions  adjusted
with  wages
G=  life  expectancy coefficient at
pension  allotment.
(P cannot  fall below social pension  if
pensioner is at least 60 years old at
the time pension  granted).
Length  of service  20 for women  and  25 for men,  5 years  minimum  10 year minimum
Incomplete  service  Pension  is  reduced  proportionately, and Not  allowed.
pensioner  made  ineligible  for  favorable
conditions.
Qualifying  service  Employment,  military  service,  educational  period,  Contributing periods, also  disability,
in-service training, time  repressed, temporary  unemployment,  sickness  and
inability  to work,  nursing  group  1  maternity,  military,  occupational  illness
invalids  or disabled  child to 16, raising  children  to or injury. Each non-contributory  period
age 8.  Work with lepers and AIDS patients  has provisions  for contributions  to SIF
doubles  service period.  Incomplete  payment  of from budget  or elsewhere.
social  tax reduces  service  credit  by  50%.
Normal  pension  age  55 for women  and  60 for men,  if length  of service  No  'normal'  age.  Minimum is  60.
fully met.  Normal  is expected  to be 65.
Indexation  of benefits  By 'changes  in index  salaries  according  to social  To  prices  until  2000.  'Taking  into
insurance  revenues'.  account  prices  and  wages' after  2000.
Taxation  of benefits  Tax exempt  Social tax  exempt (Social Tax law,
Art.6). Working  pensions  subject
to income  tax.
Early retirement  Granted to disabled, mothers with 5+ children,  All  categories  phased  out;  except
lilliputians,  dwarves,  the  blind,  Chemobyl  women,  who can receive  an actuarially
workers,  those in defined  hazardous  occupations,  fair pension at 55.  (This provision is
and those in special occupations  (i.e.,  pilots and scheduled  to be repeated).
dancers).
Credit  for deferred  pension  Pension increased by  .3,for  each  full  year Pension can  be  recalculated once
worked.  every 3  years, taking  into  account
additional
Contributions.
Additional  credits  Pension  formulas  are more  generous  for disabled  Ministry  of  Interior  supplements
veterans, interior ministry and  border guard pensions  from their budget  for
workers.  their  retirees.
40Disability  Peson  Lawon State  '  Penss  ions'  Lwd  on  Stateensions
Formula  Group I - disabled  receive  an additional  0.4* the Group  I -0.45*  the individual  average
basic  pension.  Contribution  wage  +  (service
Group II - receive  an  additional 0.2 times the years/45)*0.1*  the  individual  average
basic  pension.  contribution  wage.
Group Illi  -receive  the old age pension.  Group il - 0.40*  the individual  average
contribution  wage  +  (service
years/45*0.1* the  individual average
contribution  wage.
Group  IlIl  -the social  pension.
Length  of pension  Duration  of disability.  For permanent  disability,  Until  age  60.
until  death.
Minimum  pension  30 percent  of average  quarterly  wage  Social  pension
Qualification  Injury  or disease,  and  sufficient  length  of service. Same,  but  occupational injury  or
disease  covered  by separate  law.
Certification  Medical  commissions  Medical  commissions
Length  of service  Depends  on age,  ranges  from 1 year at age 23 to None.
15 years  at age  61 or over.
Taxation  Tax exempt  Social  tax exempt
~~~~~~0  Su-  ' r  PEnio  La  o  Stat  Penion  La  on;0  Stae P  §EnsioXs
Formula  Basic pension plus D.004*  the reference  wage.  50% of expected retirement  pension
Disabled survivors receive the  full  retirement  for one survivor,  75%  for two, and 90%
pension  each.  for three or more.
Minimum  pension  Social  pension  Social  pension
Eligible  survivors  Disabled  children  under 18 (24),  disabled  siblings  Children  under  18  not  working,
or grandchildren  under 18 if  parents unable to disabled children under 18, student
work, parents  or spouse  over retirement  age or if children to age 24, brothers,  sisters,
disabled,  divorced  spouse  receiving  alimony,  any and grandchildren  to age 18 without
family  member not  working  and  caring  for parents  capable of work.  They must
children  under 8,  and  grandparents without  be fully dependent  on the
caregivers.  Deceased.
Length  of service  If occupational  causes,  non. If other,  same  as old Same  as old age  pension.
age pension. Reduced  proportionately  if service
is not  met.
Benefit  termination  Upon  ability  to work  Upon ability to work or reaching  age
___________________________________18.
Taxation  Tax exempt  Social tax exempt (Social Tax  law,
Art.6)
Soia  Pnso  mLa  o  tae7enio777  Lw  nSocia Assitace >.|P5g  Eoils a  i  ..  :.  .r"  b:!A  ON  i 
Formula  Latvian citizens  receive the  basic  pension.  Set by Council  of  Ministers.
Foreign citizens  receive 90%  of  the  basic
pension.
Qualified  applicants  Non-working  citizens. Group 1/2/3 disabled,  men  Those unemployed  not receiving  state
over  65 and  women  over 60, disabled  children  to pensions who are 5 years over the
16,  surviving  dependent  children  pension  age.
Taxation  Tax  exempt  Tax  exempt according to  SA  law
(unless  tax law specifies  otherwise).
41TABLE 3: ACTUAL AND PROJECTED SOCIAL INSURANCE BUDGET 1993-2005.
MILLION 1997 LATS.
Year  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
(est.)
Social tax  364.5  374.9  370.7  352.7  383.9  408.5  436.3  460.4  490.2  465.6  492.3  519.6  550.1
State budget transfers to pension fund  - - - - 2.6  2.5  3.0  3.0  3.2  3.4  3.6  3.8  4.0
Other transfers, penalties, interest etc.  - - - 2.7  4.9  7.4  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.1
Total revenues  364.5  374.9  370.7  355.4  391.4  418.4  440.3  464.4  494.4  470.0  497.0  524.4  555.2
Expenditures
Pensions  305.6  318.1  304.8  324.4  341.1  383.6  410.8  417.0  415.6  422.4  437.1  444.1  445.1
Old age  195.1  239.3  231.8  250.8  267.0  301.9  327.2  333.2  334.0  340.0  353.8  359.7  359.7
Disability  42.7  55.5  55.5  52.2  53.6  57.0  59.1  59.6  58.1  59.5  60.9  62.8  64.5
Survivors  11.7  13.2  13.3  13.4  13.8  15.1  15.8  15.7  15.5  15.2  15.0  14.6  14.2
Other  56.1  10.0  4.3  7.9  6.7  9.6  8.7  8.4  8.0  7.7  7.3  7.0  6.6
Sickness benefits  16.9  - 18.8  19.1  14.7  3.3  5.4  6.5  6.8  6.7  7.1  7.4  7.8  8.3
Maternity benefits  3.9  3.2  3.2  2.8  2.5  3.9  4.4  4.6  5.2  5.7  6.4  7.1  10.1
Funeral benefits  2.2  2.9  2.7  2.4  2.4  3.0  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.4  3.5  3.6  3.7
Unemployment benefits  16.7  15.1  12.4  13.0  14.3  18.9  26.7  27.0  27.1  26.9  27.1  28.1  29.1
Work injury benefits  - - - - 0.1  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.8  0.9
Other benefits  81.0  57.8  0.1  0.1  - 0.1
Administration  10.0  7.8  7.4  8.0  8.8  9.6  11.8  12.3  13.7  15.1  15.8  16.5  17.1
Total expenditures  436.1  423.7  349.7  365.5  372.5  424.8  463.7  471.4  471.9  481.0  497.8  508.1  514.3
Cash surplus  -71.7  -48.8  21.0  -10.1  18.9  - 6.4  - 23.4  - 7.0  22.5  - 11.0  - .8  16.4  41.0
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In 1995, Latvia became  the first country in Central and Eastern  Europe
to implement parametric reform of the Soviet-style  PAYGO pension
system,  and the first in the world to implement the "notional defined
contribution system"  originally designed  for Sweden.  The  Government's
intention was to follow the overhaul of the PAYGO  system  with the
creation of a funded second tier by 1998, but the reform has  lagged.
Public acceptance  of the new system  has  been poor, and pressures  for
rollback of the reforms  have  grown. After such a splashy  beginning why
did the Latvian reform stall?  What has  been the net  effect of the reforms
after the roll backs?  How did Latvia  balance  the difficult issues  of system
incentives,  fairness  (within and across  generations)  and affordability?
What are the lessons  of the Latvian  experience with the NDC system
for other reforming countries?  These  questions  are the subject of this
paper. It includes a description of pre-reform situation, describes  the
key provisions of the original reform and discusses  the subsequent
amendments.  The impact of the reform is assessed  on the basis  of
macroeconomic  and microeconomic  simulations.  On the basis  of those,
the reforms  are evaluated  and conclusions  for other countries  are  drawn.
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